Ideas of Philippa Foot, by Theme

[British, 1920 - 2010, At Somerville College, Oxford University.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [PG]
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Hacker-Wright]
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Hacker-Wright]
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Driver]
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function