Ideas of Philippa Foot, by Theme

[British, 1920 - 2010, At Somerville College, Oxford University.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual
     Full Idea: For us there are four cardinal moral virtues: courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. But Aristotle and Aquinas call only three of these virtues moral virtues; practical wisdom (phronesis, prudentia) they class with the intellectual virtues.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.2)
     A reaction: I'm not sure about 'for us'. How many of us rank temperance as a supreme virtue? Aristotle ranks phronesis (which I think of as 'common sense') as the key enabler of the moral virtues, making it unlike the other intellectual virtues.
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime
     Full Idea: Wisdom implies no more knowledge and understanding than anyone of normal capacity can and should acquire in the course of an ordinary life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5)
     A reaction: Have philosophers stopped talking about wisdom precisely because you now need three university degrees to be considered even remotely good at phillosophy? Hence wisdom is an inferior attainment, because Foot is right.
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained
     Full Idea: Knowledge that can be acquired only by someone who is clever or who has access to special training is not counted as part of wisdom.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.6)
     A reaction: Consider Pierre's peasant friend Platon Karatayev in 'War and Peace'. I assume 'special training' rules out anyone with a philosophy degree.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it
     Full Idea: There belongs to truthfulness not only the avoidance of lying but also that other kind of attachment to truth which has to do with its preservation and pursuit.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.74)
     A reaction: This is truth as a value, rather than as a mere phenomenon of accurate thought and speech. The importance of 'preserving' the truth is the less common part of this idea.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people'
     Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
     A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors
     Full Idea: The determinism which worries the defender of free will is that if human action is subject to a universal law of causation, there will be for any action a set of sufficient conditions which can be traced back to factors outside the control of the agent.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.63)
     A reaction: She draws on Russell for this, but neither of them mention whether the causation is physical. Free will seems to imply non-physical causation.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality
     Full Idea: You haven't got a full idea of rationality until you've got morality within it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35)
     A reaction: Does this mean that mathematical proofs are not rational, or that they are moral?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality
     Full Idea: If justice is a virtue it must make action good by disposing its possessor to goodness in practical rationality; the latter consisting of the right recognition of reasons, and corresponding action.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.174)
     A reaction: This somewhat inverts Aristotle, who says the possessing of good practical reason is the key to acquiring the virtues. Foot suggests that possessing the virtue promotes the practical rationality. Someone can be sensible without being virtuous.
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will
     Full Idea: I want to say, baldly, that there is no criterion for practical rationality that is not derived from that of goodness of will.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Where does that put the successful and clever criminal? Presumably they are broadly irrational, but narrowly rational - but that is not very clear distinction. She says Kant's concept of the good will is too pure, and unrelated to human good.
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions
     Full Idea: Practical rationality is goodness in respect of reason for actions, just as rationality of thinking is goodness in respect of beliefs.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.35)
     A reaction: It is very Greek to think that rationality involves goodness. There seems to be a purely instrumental form of practical reason that just gets from A to B, as when giving accurate street directions to someone.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive
     Full Idea: We do not expect that everything a rational man does should be done with a motive, ...but we do expect a man to have a motive for many things that he does, and would count anyone who constantly performed troublesome actions without a motive as irrational.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.66)
     A reaction: Interestng, because the assessment of whether someone is 'rational' therefore needs a criterion for when a motive seems required and when not. 'Significant' actions need a motive?
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires
     Full Idea: I am sure I do not understand the idea of a reason for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either. I incline to the view that all such reasons depend either on the agent's interests (meaning here what is in his interest) or else on his desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reasons for Actions and Desires [1972], p.156 Post)
     A reaction: It seems common to assume that a reason for an action must be something rational, but it makes sense to say that the reason for someone's action was an irrational whim. Is the reason for an action just the cause of the action?
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
     Full Idea: One would need a very special, very Humean, view about reasons for actions to think a man doesn't have a reason unless he cares.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.34-5)
     A reaction: She says she used to believe this, but was wrong. It is hard to imagine acting for reasons if they don't care about anything at all (even that it's their job). But then people just do care about things.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation
     Full Idea: The 'remainder' after a dilemma can't be a matter of apology and restitution, because the dilemma may only involve the agent's own life, and in the case of broken promises we only owe an explanation, if the breaking is justifiable.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.183) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: But what if someone has been financially ruined by it? If the agent feels guilty about that, is getting over it the rational thing to do? (Foot says that is an new obligation, and not part of the original dilemma).
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does
     Full Idea: I do not see how …we can know how to interpret the idea of a situation in which someone will necessarily be wrong whatever he does.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Dilemmas Revisited [1995], p.188)
     A reaction: Seems right. If you think of hideous dilemmas (frequent in wartime), there must always be a right thing to do (or two equally right things to do), even if the outcome is fairly hideous. Just distinguish the right from the good.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable
     Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20)
     A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible.
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended
     Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22)
     A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding?
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23)
     A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs.
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow
     Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended).
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it.
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse
     Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant.
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it
     Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
     A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable
     Full Idea: Many philosophers (e.g. Rachels) have argued that there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and allowing to die (or the related 'acts and omissions'),..as in not sending food, or sending poisoned food. I disagree.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.78)
     A reaction: It appears that some omissions are worse than acts. It is more honest to just shoot an injured person, than to walk away and leave them to die. A range of cases.
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one
     Full Idea: If a runaway tram is heading towards a track on which five people are standing, and there is someone who can switch the points, diverting it onto a track where there is one person,...this is diverting a fatal sequence, not starting a new one.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.85)
     A reaction: Suppose the one person was of immense community value, or someone you personally hated? Clearly she is interested in the agent's virtue, rather than the actual consequences.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder
     Full Idea: While one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
     A reaction: She then refers to abortion, but there are military and criminal problem cases, and killings by neglect or side effect.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life
     Full Idea: A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.6)
     A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this approach to morality, which anchors it in real life, rather than in ideals or principles of reason.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods
     Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable'
     Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15)
     A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot.
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble
     Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
     A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker
     Full Idea: What all these [non-cognitivist] theories try to do is to give the conditions of use of sentences such as 'It is morally objectionable to break promises', in terms of something which must be true about the speaker.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: A wonderfully simple and accurate analysis of this view. Compare analysing 'there is a bus coming towards you' in the same way. Sounds silly, but lots of modern philosophers see things that way.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility
     Full Idea: Moral, as opposed to aesthetic, evaluation does require some distinction between actions for which we are responsible and those for which we are not responsible.
     From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.154)
     A reaction: It is hard to disagree with this, but difficult to give a precise account of responsibility, probably because it is not an all-or-nothing matter. If we accept responsibility for our controlled actions, why not for our considered aesthetic judgements?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires
     Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire
     Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
     A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
Reason is not a motivator of morality
     Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules.
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent
     Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161)
     A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires.
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality
     Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity.
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required
     Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects
     Full Idea: We describe defects in human beings in the same way as we do defects in plants and animals. …You cannot talk about a river as being defective.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a much clearer commitment to naturalistic ethics than I have found in her more academic writings. My opinion of Foot (which was already high) went up when I read this interview. …She says vice is a defect of the will.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings
     Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
     Full Idea: No one thinks that calling a knife a good knife, a farmer a good farmer, a speech a good speech, a root a good root, necessarily expresses or even involves an attitude or feeling towards it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.163)
     A reaction: This is the Aristotelian idea (which I favour) that good derives from function. In such a case it seems obvious that it has nothing to do with expressing emotions.
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
     Full Idea: The mistake is to think that whatever 'grounds' for a moral judgement may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral judgement, because he has not got the attitude or feeling.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.192)
     A reaction: This is roughly the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism, of how we still make moral judgements about situations where we ourselves are entirely disinterested (such as ancient historical events).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad'
     Full Idea: It is suggested that anyone who has considered all the facts which could bear on his moral position has ipso facto produced a 'well founded' moral judgement, ...How 'x is good' can be well founded when 'x is bad' is equally well founded is hard to see.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.96)
     A reaction: This seems to be a warning to particularists, if they hope that moral judgements just emerge from the facts. It doesn't rule out physicalist naturalism about morality, if the attitudes we bring to the facts have arisen out of further facts.
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not
     Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3)
     A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good.
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees
     Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2)
     A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies).
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things
     Full Idea: There are concepts which apply only to living things, considered in their own right, which would include function, welfare, flourishing, interests and the good of something.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a very Aristotelian view, with which I entirely agree. The central concept is function.
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots
     Full Idea: A plant needs strong roots in the same way human beings need courage.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I'm not quite convince by the analogy, but I strongly agree with her basic approach.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed
     Full Idea: I do not know what could be meant by saying it was someone's duty to do something unless there was an attempt to show why it mattered if this sort of thing was not done.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.105)
     A reaction: The Kantian idea assumes that duty is an absolute, and yet each duty rests on a particular maxim which is going to be universalised. So why should that maxim be universalised, and not some other?
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value
     Full Idea: Whether a man is speaking of behaviour as rude or not rude, he must use the same criteria as anyone else. ...We have here an example of a non-evaluative premise from which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.104)
     A reaction: We would now call 'rude' a 'thick' ethical concept (where 'good' is 'thin'). Her powerful point is, I take it, that evidence is always relevant to judgements of thick concepts, so there is no fact-value gap. 'Rude' has criteria, but 'good' may not.
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness
     Full Idea: To show that facts and values are connected we must show that some things do and some things don't count in favour of a moral conclusion, and that no one can choose what counts as evidence for rightness or wrongness.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Arguments [1958], p.99)
     A reaction: But what sort of facts might do the job? I can only think of right functioning and health as facts which seem to imply value. Pleasure and misery don't quite get there.
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts
     Full Idea: The grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? [1995], p.207)
     A reaction: The best slogan I can find for summarising Foot's metaethics. The facts she refers to the basic human needs. She is right, and this almost bridges the fact-value divide (as long as you give a damn about human needs).
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning
     Full Idea: A moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: She avoids the word 'function', and only deals with living creatures, but she uses a 'good knife' as an example, and this Aristotelian view clearly applies to any machine which has a function.
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark'
     Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity
     Full Idea: When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, ...maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.9)
     A reaction: Foot favours the idea that such a claim must depend on reasons, and that the reasons arise out of actual living. She's right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it?
     Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
     A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life
     Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37)
     A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?'
     Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34)
     A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities
     Full Idea: Being a good father, or daughter, or friend seems to depend on one's intentions, rather than on such things as cleverness and strength.
     From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.138)
     A reaction: Not sure about that. In wartime a good father might need to be actually brave, and in times of hardship be actually economically successful. 'He meant well, but he was a hopeless father'?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
     Full Idea: There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
     A reaction: I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad?
     Full Idea: We should ask why we think that it makes sense to talk about morally good and bad states of affairs.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.68)
     A reaction: This is the key question in her attack on consequentialism. There is nothing 'morally' good about my football team winning a great victory.
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness
     Full Idea: For consequentialists there will be nothing that it will not be right to do to a perfectly innocent individual, if that is the only way of preventing another agent from doing more things of the same kind.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.61)
     A reaction: This is her generalised version that Williams dramatised as Jim and the Indians. Roughly, if you achieve a good outcome, it matters little how it is achieved. Foot sees consequentialism as the main problem with utilitarianism.
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions
     Full Idea: It is not that maximum welfare or 'the best outcome' stands outside morality as it foundation and arbiter, but rather that it appears within morality as the end of one of the virtues.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.73)
     A reaction: She cites justice and benevolence as aiming at different (and even conflicting) outcomes. I'm not sure about her distinction between 'outside' and 'within' morality. I suppose a virtuously created end is a moral end, unlike mere good states of affairs.
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon
     Full Idea: The idea of the goodness of total states of affairs played no part in Aristotle's moral philosophy, and in modern times plays not part either in Rawls's account of justice or in the theories of more thoroughgoing contractualists such as Scanlon.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.76)
     A reaction: We can add Kant to that. But if the supremely good state of affairs were permanently achieved, would that make morality irrelevant? A community of the exceptionally virtuous would not need the veil of ignorance, or contracts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life
     Full Idea: Possible objects of deep happiness seem to be things that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and work, and friendship.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6)
     A reaction: I've not encountered discussion of 'deep' happiness before. I heard of an old man in tears because he had just seen a Purple Emperor butterfly for the first time. She makes it sound very conservative. How about mountaineering achievements?
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends
     Full Idea: In my terminology 'happiness' is understood as the enjoyment of good things, meaning the enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 6)
     A reaction: A modified version of Aristotle's view, which she contrasts with McDowell's identification of happiness with the life of virtue. They all seem to have an optimistic hope that the pleasure in being a bit wicked is false happiness.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent
     Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that one criterion for a good moral system is that it should be possible to demand reciprocity from every individual because of the good the system renders to him.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.104)
     A reaction: Money seems to have this feature, that we mostly conform to the rules for its use, because we value the whole system. Foot accepts this, but says there are also other criteria, such as leaving freedom to live well (ie. not too puritanical).
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life
     Full Idea: We know perfectly well that it is not true that the best life would consist in successfully pretending friendship: having friends to serve one but without being a real friend oneself.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7)
     A reaction: For some skallywags the achieving of something for nothing seems to be very much the good life, but not many of them want to exploit people who are seen to be their friends.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions
     Full Idea: Hardly anyone sees any difficulty in the thought that virtues may sometimes be displayed in bad actions. The courage of the villain can be spoken of as quite unproblematic.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III)
     A reaction: She cites Peter Geach as a sole opponent of this view. The courage of the entire German army in WWII seems to fall into this category. The boldness of villains has to impress the virtuous but timid.
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings
     Full Idea: A popular view (expressed by Philippa Foot) is that the virtues work to 'correct' for the baser human impulses and motives. …Virtues are solutions to design flaws in human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978]) by Julia Driver - The Virtues and Human Nature 1
     A reaction: Quite a plausible thought. Not so much design flaws, though, as natural traits of character that suited hunter gatherers but not modern cosmopolitan capitalists. Driver disagrees.
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous
     Full Idea: Some actions are in accordance with virtue without requiring virtue for their performance, whereas others are both in accordance with virtue and such as to show possession of a virtue.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], p.13)
     A reaction: She cites the case of an honest trader, who is honest because of self-interest. She is disentangling Kant from his daft idea that only dutiful (and reluctant) actions are virtuous. Kant was only thinking of 'in accordance' cases.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation
     Full Idea: The virtues are corrective, each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II)
     A reaction: A beautifully simple and accurate observation, which I don't remember meeting in Aristotle (...though she cites him as saying that virtues concern what is difficult for us). Justice and charity are given as examples of inadequate motivation.
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts
     Full Idea: The key notion is the concept of need, …as when we say what a plant or animal of a certain species needs to have, …and what its operative features, such roots, leaves, hearts and lungs, need to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.164)
     A reaction: Good. That takes it away from the idea of a function, which could be possessed by an inanimate machine (even though that still entails success and failure). Strictly, we need oxygen, but the goodness resides in the lungs.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions
     Full Idea: Some philosophers insist that dispositions, motives and other 'internal' elements are the primary determinants of moral goodness and badness. I have never been a 'virtue ethicist' is this sense. For me it is what is done that stands in this position.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Goodness [2004], p.2), quoted by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 4 'Virtue'
     A reaction: [She mentions Hursthouse, Slote, Swanton] I'm quite struck by this. Aristotle insists that morality concerns actions. It doesn't seem that a person could be a saint by having wonderful dispositions, but doing nothing. Paraplegics?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them
     Full Idea: Some virtues do give us aims, but nothing from within morality suggests the kind of good state of affairs which it would seem always to be our duty to promote. And why indeed should there be any such thing?
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Isn't successful human functioning, such as heath, always to be desired? If honour is a worthy aim, doesn't that make being rightly honoured a desirable state of affairs? She is attacking consequentialism, but I'm not convinced here.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing
     Full Idea: It makes sense to say that a man acts out of vanity on a particular occasion although he is not in general vain, or even vain about this kind of thing.
     From: Philippa Foot (Free Will as Involving Determinism [1957], p.69)
     A reaction: Aristotle tells us that virtues and vices are habits, and also have an intellectual component, implying that the person believes in that sort of behaviour. Anyone can have 'a little moment of vanity'.
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory
     Full Idea: To speak of a good person is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of faculties such as sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will (his 'will as controllable by reason').
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 5)
     A reaction: She more or less agrees with Kant that the only truly good moral thing is a good will, though she has plenty of other criticisms of his views.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement
     Full Idea: Maybe so far from forming a unity ...., the virtues actually conflict with each other: that is, if someone has one of them he inevitably fails to have some other. ...Maybe he a man can only be good in one way be being bad in another.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma [1983], p.57)
     A reaction: She suggests the self-loathing needed to rein in evil desires. She cites Nietzsche having a similar thought. Presumably the ideal virtuous person has no such conflicts, and the self-loathing undermines eudaimonia. Unity in theory but not in practice?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment
     Full Idea: Virtues such as justice consist mainly in adherence to rules of conduct, while those such as benevolence we might call virtues of attachment.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.101)
     A reaction: Not sure about 'attachment'. We should be benevolent towards people to whom we are not particularly attached. Courage doesn't fall into either group.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism
     Full Idea: In some people temperance is not a virtue, but is rather connected with timidity or with a grudging attitude to the acceptance of good things.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], III)
     A reaction: Timidity seems right. The grudging attitude may result from some larger doubts about pleasure, which could be plausible.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality
     Full Idea: I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.
     From: Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)
     A reaction: {My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees
     Full Idea: The teaching and observing of the rules of justice is as necessary a part of the life of human beings as hunting together in packs with a leader is a necessary part of the lives of wolves, or dancing part of the life of the dancing bee.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Virtue [1994], p.168)
     A reaction: So why are some men unjust? All wolves hunt, and all appropriate bees dance. A few men even thrive on injustice.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety
     Full Idea: The fears that count against a man's courage are those that we think he should overcome, and among them, in a special class, those that reflect the fact that he values his safety too much.
     From: Philippa Foot (Virtues and Vices [1978], II)
     A reaction: I think that sentence tells us more accurately what courage is than anything in Aristotle's discussion. Ask yourself which of your fears really ought to be overcome, and particularly beware of over-valuing your own safety. But stay safe if you can!
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system
     Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18)
     A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does
     Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164)
     A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion.
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires
     Full Idea: Moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they give reasons for acting only in conjunction with interests and desires.
     From: Philippa Foot (Reply to Professor Frankena [1975], p.177)
     A reaction: This is a splendid claim, which points to a more sensibly naturalistic ethics. There seem to be occasions for moral behaviour where I have no interests or desires, such as when a stranger asks me for a favour and I'm feeling tired.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone
     Full Idea: It would be more honest to recognise that the 'should' of moral judgement is sometimes merely an instrument by which we (for our own very good reasons) try to impose a rule of conduct even on the uncaring man?
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.18)
     A reaction: This is a good example, I think, of the ordinary language tradition that Foot grew up in. We load a word like 'should' with a mystical power, but the situations in which it is actually used bring us back down to earth.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community
     Full Idea: Morality is thought of as a kind of tacit legislation by the community.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.75)
     A reaction: Foot presents this as a utilitarian doctrine, because the tacit legislation is felt to produce the best outcomes. This is Nietzsche's good and evil, beyond which he wished to go (presumably following other values).
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly
     Full Idea: It would be irrational to obey even the most useful rule if in a particular instance we clearly see that such obedience will not have the best results.
     From: Philippa Foot (Utilitarianism and the Virtues [1985], p.62)
     A reaction: This is the simple reason why attempts at rule utilitarianism always lead back to act utilitarianism. Another way of putting it is that a good rule can only be assessed by the outcomes of individual acts that follow it.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment
     Full Idea: If a stranger should come on us when we are sleeping he will not think it all right to kill us. …In human life as it is, this kind of action is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment in the one who does it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 7)
     A reaction: A rare swipe from Foot at existentialism, which she hardly ever mentions. I find it hard to see these existential virtues as in any way moral. It means nothing to other citizens whether one of their number is 'authentic'.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive')
     Full Idea: There are rights to non-interference (and their corresponding "negative duties"), and the rights to goods and services (with corresponding "positive duties"). Interference usually needs more justification than withholding goods.
     From: Philippa Foot (Killing and Letting Die [1985], p.82)
     A reaction: This invites the question of which is the stronger, and whether paternalism can overrule non-interference, or an expectation of self-sufficiency overrule the positive rights.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights
     Full Idea: One reason why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.19)
     A reaction: We also do and don't want children to have the same rights as adults. Rights should accrue with development and maturity, it seems. No one thinks sperm and egg have rights. Why stop at 'adult'? Superior adults deserve more rights!
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice
     Full Idea: In the problem of abortion there is a genuine choice as to whether or not to count as a human being, with the rights of a human being, what would become a human being but is not yet capable of independent life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
     A reaction: There must be some basis for the choice. We can't call a dead person a human being. Choosing to call a tiny zygote a human being seems very implausible. Pre-viability strikes me as implausible.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function
     Full Idea: The word 'knife' names an object in respect of its function. That is not to say (simply) that it names an object which has a function, but also that the function is involved in the meaning of the word.
     From: Philippa Foot (Goodness and Choice [1961], p.134)
     A reaction: It seems faintly possible that someone (a child, perhaps) could know the word and recognise the object, but not know what the object is for. Ditto with other things which have functional names.