Ideas of Peter Forrest, by Theme

[American, fl. 2009, At the University of New England.]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17962	The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker
	Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker.
	From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1)
	A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15432	Structural universals might serve as possible worlds
	Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds.
	From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro'
	A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions?