19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it |

19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth |

19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory |

19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative |

19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new |

19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness |

19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent |

19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts |

19123 | If soundness cannot be proved internally, 'reflection principles' be added which assert soundness |

19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas |

19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories |