12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure |

8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic |

12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true |

10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological |

10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized |

8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic |

8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' |

10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts |

10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity |

8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology |

10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers |

8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach |

12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment |

12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? |

12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence |

12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology |

18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses |

10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to |

12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp |

10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities |

8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines |

12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions |

12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense |

10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions |