Ideas of John Hawthorne, by Theme

[British, b.1964, Degree at Manchester. Professor at Rutgers University, then Waynflete Professor at Oxford University.]

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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power
Is the causal profile of a property its essence?
Could two different properties have the same causal profile?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all?
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 5. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / g. Eliminating causation
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else