Ideas of John Heil, by Theme

[American, fl. 1996, Professor at Davidson College, North Carolina, the Washington Univ, St Louis.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
18495 The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
18494 Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
18506 Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
18535 Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
7001 If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
7037 Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
7038 A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
18534 Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18531 Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18509 Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
7004 The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
7035 God does not create the world, and then add the classes
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
18518 Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
18500 How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
7017 The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
18539 Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
7003 There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
7045 Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
7065 Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
18505 Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
18499 Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18512 Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
7020 Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21339 We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them
21349 Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties
21340 Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations
18508 Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers
21351 Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation
21344 If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R
18532 If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18510 We need properties to explain how the world works
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
18522 Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
18513 Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
7007 I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
7015 A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
18533 In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
18540 Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
18511 Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18523 Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
18524 Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
7025 Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
7034 Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
7039 How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
7008 Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
7018 Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
18498 Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
18507 Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
7019 Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
7047 Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
7048 Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18515 Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
18516 A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18514 Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
18517 Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
18502 If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
7028 If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
7029 Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
7030 Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
7051 Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
7044 Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
7052 Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
7053 Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
7066 If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
7021 If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
7026 Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
7060 One form of explanation is by decomposition
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
7010 Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
7054 Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7011 Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
18525 Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18504 Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
7061 Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
7063 Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
7064 Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
7062 Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
7059 The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
7012 If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
7043 Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
18503 You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
18537 Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
18538 Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
7057 Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7013 The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
18536 The subject-predicate form reflects reality
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
7002 If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18497 Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
18519 If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
18526 We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
18527 Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
7016 The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
18520 Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
18501 Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
7036 The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties