Ideas of Thomas Hofweber, by Theme

[German, fl. 2004, MA at Munich, PhD at Stanford. Professor at University of N.Carolina at Chapel Hill.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics beyond Science
Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Against Metaphysics
Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics?
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc)
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / a. Numbers
'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural
What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects
19. Language / G. Interpretation / 1. Translation
Holism says says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can