Ideas of Thomas S. Kuhn, by Theme

[American, 1922 - 1997, Born in Cincinnatti. Pupil of Willard Quine. Professor at Chicago University, and at Princeton.]

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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'Truth' may only apply within a theory
     Full Idea: 'Truth' may, like 'proof', be a term with only intra-theoretic applications.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §5)
     A reaction: I think we can blame Tarski (via Quine, Kuhn's teacher) for this one. I take it to be an utter failure to grasp the meaning of the word 'truth' (and sneakily substituting 'satisfaction' for it). For a start, we have to compare theories on some basis.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Most theories are continually falsified
     Full Idea: Kuhn contends that almost all theories are falsified at almost all times.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 07.1
     A reaction: This is obviously meant to demolish Karl Popper.
Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on
     Full Idea: In Kuhn's view scientists are decidedly not interested in falsifying their paradigm, because without a paradigm there is no systematic inquiry at all.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Geoffrey Gorham - Philosophy of Science 3
     A reaction: This seems to be one of the stronger aspects of Kuhn's account. You'd be leaving the big house, to go out on the road with a tent.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values
     Full Idea: Kuhn later came to accept that there are five values to which scientists in all paradigms adhere: accuracy; consistency with accepted theories; broad scope; simplicity; and fruitfulness.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.8
     A reaction: To shake off the relativism for which Kuhn is notorious, we should begin by asking the question WHY scientists favoured these particular values, rather than (say) bizarreness, consistency with Lewis Carroll, or alliteration. (They are epistemic virtues).
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience
     Full Idea: The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience which cannot be forced.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]), quoted by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5
     A reaction: This is the controversial part of Kuhn, which says that the most important decisions are not really rational. Anyone who thought the interpretation of a bunch of evidence is logical needed their head examined. But it IS rational.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions
     Full Idea: Kuhn and Feyerabend adopt a description theory of reference; the term 'electron' refers to whatever satisfies the descriptions associated with electrons, and since these descriptions vary between theories, so too must the reference.
     From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.3
     A reaction: This is a key idea in modern philosophy, showing why all of reality and science were at stake when Kripke and others introduced a causal theory of reference. All the current debates about externalism and essentialism grow from this problem.
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory
     Full Idea: The doctrine of incommensurability stems from Kuhn's belief that scientific concepts derive their meaning from the theory in which they play a role.
     From: report of Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Samir Okasha - Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) 5
     A reaction: Quine was the source of this. Kripke's direct reference theory was meant to be the answer.
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them
     Full Idea: To tell us that Galileo had 'incommensurable' notions and then go on to describe them at length is totally incoherent.
     From: comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.5
     A reaction: How refreshingly sensible. Incommensurability is the sort of nonsense you slide into if you take an instrumental view of science. But scientists are continually aim to pin down what is actually there. Translation between theories is very difficult!
In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable
     Full Idea: In transitions between theories words change their meanings or applicability. Though most of the signs are used before and after a revolution - force, mass, cell - the ways they attach to nature has changed. Successive theories are thus incommensurable.
     From: Thomas S. Kuhn (Reflections on my Critics [1970], §6)
     A reaction: A very nice statement of the view, from the horse's mouth. A great deal of recent philosophy has been implicitly concerned with meeting Kuhn's challenge, by providing an account of reference that doesn't have such problems.