Ideas of David Liggins, by Theme

[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at the University of Manchester.]

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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances
     Full Idea: We should interpret philosophers as if their own theory of the meaning of their utterances were true, whether or not we agree with that theory.
     From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8)
     A reaction: This seems to give legitimate grounds for some sorts of ad hominem objections. It would simply be an insult to a philosopher not to believe their theories, and then apply them to what they have said. This includes semantic theories.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence
     Full Idea: My charge is that truth-maker theory cannot be integrated into an attractive general account of non-causal dependence.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.6)
     A reaction: [You'll have to read Liggins to see why]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
     Full Idea: Many philosophers agree that true existential propositions have a truth-maker, but some go further, claiming that every true proposition has a truth-maker. More cautious theorists specify a class of truths, such as synthetic propositions.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.1)
     A reaction: [compressed; Armstrong is the ambitious one, and Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes the synthetic propositions] Presumably synthetic propositions can make negative assertions, which are problematic for truth-makers.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong
     Full Idea: It is quite standard to interpret sentences of the form 'There are Fs' using a singular quantifier and a singular predicate, but this tradition may be mistaken.
     From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 8)
     A reaction: Liggins is clearly in support of the use of plural quantification, referring to 'there are some xs such that'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists
     Full Idea: Either p or not-p. If p, then the proposition 'p' is true. If not p, then the proposition 'not p' is true. Either way, something is true. Thus something exists.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.3 n5)
     A reaction: Liggins offers this dodgy argument as an objection to conceptual truths having truth-makers.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts
     Full Idea: The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates appears to involve a set and a philosopher, neither of which is a fact.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.6)
     A reaction: He points out that defenders of facts as the basis of dependence could find a suitable factual paraphrase here. Socrates is just Socrates, but the singleton has to be understood in a particular way to generate the dependence.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood
     Full Idea: Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.8)
     A reaction: Not very helpful, you may be thinking, but it is always helpful to know where we have got to in the enquiry.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything
     Full Idea: Necessities supervene upon everything, but they do not depend on everything.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4)
     A reaction: I'm not sure if merely existing together counts as sufficiently close to be 'supervenience'. If 2+2 necessitates 4, that hardly seems to 'supervene' on the Eiffel Tower. If so, how close must things be to qualify for supervenience?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys
     Full Idea: We can interpret '..is a part of..' as '..are among..': the xs are a part of the ys just when the xs are among the ys (though if the ys are 'one' then they would not have parts).
     From: David Liggins (Nihilism without Self-Contradiction [2008], 9)
     A reaction: The trouble is that this still leaves us with gerrymandered 'parts', in the form of xs that are scattered randomly among the ys. That's not what we mean by 'part'. No account of identity works if it leaves out coherent structure.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation
     Full Idea: 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.5)
     A reaction: Aristotle starts from words like 'why?', but it can be a deceptive approach to explanation.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain
     Full Idea: 'It is wrong because it produces pain for fun', and 'these constitute a table because they are arranged tablewise', and 'tea is poisonous because it contains arsenic' are clearly non-causal uses of 'because', and neither are they conceptual.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4)
     A reaction: The general line seems to be that any form of determination will underwrite an explanation. He talks later of the 'wrongmaker' and 'poisonmaker' relationships to add to the 'truthmaker'. The table example is the 'object-maker' dependence relation.
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist
     Full Idea: If explanation often tracks dependence, then we have a theoretical reason to expect such explanations to exist. Let us call such explanations 'determinative'.
     From: David Liggins (Truth-makers and dependence [2012], 10.4)
     A reaction: There seems to be an emerging understanding that this 'determination' relation is central to all of explanation - with causal explanations, for example, being a particular instance of it. I like it. These are real, not conventional, explanations.