Ideas of Peter Lipton, by Theme

[American, 1954 - 2007, Professor at Cambridge University.]

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
16841 Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
16854 Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16814 Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
16825 How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
16851 The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16799 Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability
16798 We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
16856 It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it
16857 Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
16827 If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from?
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
16804 Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
16823 Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
16858 We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction
16800 An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
16832 If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens)
16836 My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens
16831 A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes
16833 We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory
16834 To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
16801 A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true
16803 Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it
16839 Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem
16802 Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
16837 Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising'
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
16850 Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
16807 An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred
16808 An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us
16806 An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding
16822 Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
16816 In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil?
16826 With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16811 An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16810 Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts!
16829 We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad
16809 Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
16812 An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
16846 A cause may not be an explanation
16813 To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism
16815 Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal
16849 Explanations may be easier to find than causes
16848 Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16842 We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
16840 To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
16820 Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding
16824 Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause?
16817 Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations
16818 The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding
16819 IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation
16828 IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search
16844 A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation
16853 We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16821 Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant?
16838 Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position
16855 The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do'
16852 Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
16847 Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient