Ideas of Edwin D. Mares, by Theme
[New Zealand, fl. 2001, Lecturer at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.]
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713

After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781

Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789

Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction

18790

Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. ManyValued Logic
18787

Threevalued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18784

In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws

18793

Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
18780

Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence

18786

Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use noncontradiction, De M 3, or double negation

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782

The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783

Manyvalued logics lack a natural deduction system

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792

Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations

5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785

Consistency is semantic, but noncontradiction is syntactic

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715

The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716

Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
18788

For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703

Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714

Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705

Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700

The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704

Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710

Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706

The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791

In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701

Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements

19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702

Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components

27. Natural Reality / C. SpaceTime / 1. Space / c. Points in space
17708

Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size
