Ideas of G.E. Moore, by Theme

[British, 1873 - 1958, Born in London. Friend of Russell. Professor at Cambridge University. Wittgenstein was a pupil.]

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1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Grayling]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Monk]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross]