Ideas of J.P. Moreland, by Theme

[American, fl. 2001, Biola University, California]

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 4. Time / f. Presentism
'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists