Ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche, by Theme

[German, 1844 - 1900, Born at Röcken. Son of Lutheran pastor. Young professor of philology at University of Basel. Insane for the last ten years of his life.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever!
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Suffering is the meaning of existence
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek?
'Wisdom' attempts to get beyond perspectives, making it hostile to life
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
All intelligent Romans were Epicureans
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates
I revere Heraclitus
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Ansell Pearson]
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants
Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned
A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it
The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works
What matters is how humans can be developed
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
It would better if there was no thought
Why do people want philosophers?
Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems!
Words such as 'I' and 'do' and 'done to' are placed at the point where our ignorance begins
Pessimism is laughable, because the world cannot be evaluated
Is a 'philosopher' now impossible, because knowledge is too vast for an overview?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness!
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system
Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Richardson]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith'
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness'
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity'
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
With dialectics the rabble gets on top
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Only that which has no history is definable
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Anything which must first be proved is of little value
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive
Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception?
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem
Like all philosophers, I love truth
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral?
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source
Truth has had to be fought for, and normal life must be sacrificed to achieve it
One must never ask whether truth is useful
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth
To love truth, you must know how to lie
Only because there is thought is there untruth
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is just slavery to language
Logic tries to understand the world according to a man-made scheme
Logic is not driven by truth, but desire for a simple single viewpoint
Logic must falsely assume that identical cases exist
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is'
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Critchley]
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego'
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts'
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Categories are not metaphysical truths, but inventions in the service of needs
Philosophers find it particularly hard to shake off belief in necessary categories
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers!
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things'
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Maybe there are only subjects, and 'objects' result from relations between subjects
Counting needs unities, but that doesn't mean they exist; we borrowed it from the concept of 'I'
In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing'
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!)
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing'
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event
Something can be irrefutable; that doesn't make it true
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge!
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail
Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant)
Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged
Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things
The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Fogelin]
It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective
Comprehending everything is impossible, because it abolishes perspectives
Is the perspectival part of the essence, or just a relation between beings?
'Perspectivism': the world has no meaning, but various interpretations give it countless meanings
'Subjectivity' is an interpretation, since subjects (and interpreters) are fictions
There are different eyes, so different 'truths', so there is no truth
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is just showing the succession of things ever more clearly
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus
The intellect and senses are a simplifying apparatus
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity
With protoplasm ½+½=2, so the soul is not an indivisible monad
Unity is not in the conscious 'I', but in the organism, which uses the self as a tool
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness
Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing
Consciousness exists to the extent that consciousness is useful
Consciousness is a 'tool' - just as the stomach is a tool
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness
Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd!
We think each thought causes the next, unaware of the hidden struggle beneath
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind
The 'I' is a conceptual synthesis, not the governor of our being
The 'I' is a fiction used to make the world of becoming 'knowable'
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want
'Freedom of will' is the feeling of having a dominating force
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!)
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words
Thoughts are signs (just as words are)
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious
Rationality is a scheme we cannot cast away
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Foot]
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings
The will is constantly frustrated by the past
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding
The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control
There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature
The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts!
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Experiencing a thing as beautiful is to experience it wrongly
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious?
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty'
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Without music life would be a mistake
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will'
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Foot]
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs
We must question the very value of moral values
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination
Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience?
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Roochnik]
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth
Values are innate and inherited
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good'
Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Leiter]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot]
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia
Christianity is at war with the higher type of man, and excommunicates his basic instincts
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Richardson]
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Foot]
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Knowledge, wisdom and goodness only have value relative to a goal
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless
Value judgements about life can never be true
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us
The value of life cannot be estimated
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people
Altruism is praised by the egoism of the weak, who want everyone to be looked after
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love!
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good
We only really love children and work
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal
A living being is totally 'egoistic'
The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes
A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Modest people express happiness as 'Not bad'
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
I want my work, not happiness!
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail
Only the English actually strive after happiness
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value)
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives
The only happiness is happiness with illusion
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure needs dissatisfaction, boundaries and resistances
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people
The noble soul has reverence for itself
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism"
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nagel]
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue'
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed)
No two actions are the same
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Foot]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Foot]
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic
Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy'
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open
What does not kill us makes us stronger
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude
Courage, compassion, insight, solitude are the virtues, with courtesy a necessary vice
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show)
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice')
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues
Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton]
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity
Invalids are parasites
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it
If you want friends, you must be a fighter
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative
Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special
We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski]
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted
Not feeling harnessed to a system of 'ends' is a wonderful feeling of freedom
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Zizek]
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings!
Nihilism results from measuring the world by our categories which are purely invented
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly
To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar
Flight from boredom leads to art
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Ansell Pearson]
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed
By developing herd virtues man fixes what has up to now been the 'unfixed animal'
Virtues from outside are dangerous, and they should come from within
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern
To become what you are you must have no self-awareness
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
The best life is the dangerous life
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Safranski]
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again
Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Critchley]
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence?
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them
Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created
Existence without meaning or goal or end, eternally recurring, is a terrible thought
Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is above all a judging animal
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
An enduring people needs its own individual values
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract'
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture cannot do without passions and vices
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
The upholding of the military state is needed to maintain the strong human type
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value
Democracy is organisational power in decline
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights arise out of contracts, which need a balance of power
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed!
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made
Modern wars arise from the study of history
To renounce war is to renounce the grand life
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys!
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is contrary to human nature
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves
There is a need for educators who are themselves educated
One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should evaluate the past morally
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another!
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed)
'Purpose' is like the sun, where most heat is wasted, and a tiny part has 'purpose'
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now
'Purpose' is just a human fiction
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
We do not know the nature of one single causality
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Things are strong or weak, and do not behave regularly or according to rules or compulsions
Chemical 'laws' are merely the establishment of power relations between weaker and stronger
All motions and 'laws' are symptoms of inner events, traceable to the will to power
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull
The utility of an organ does not explain its origin, on the contrary!
Survival might undermine an individual's value, or prevent its evolution
Darwin overestimates the influence of 'external circumstances'
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance
Remove goodness and wisdom from our concept of God. Being the highest power is enough!
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
A God who cures us of a head cold at the right moment is a total absurdity
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Morality kills religion, because a Christian-moral God is unbelievable
It is dishonest to invent a being containing our greatest values, thus ignoring why they exist and are valuable
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality can only be upheld by belief in God and a 'hereafter'
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God'
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
God is dead, and we have killed him
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods!
By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world
I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves
Paganism is a form of thanking and affirming life?
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest
Christ was the noblest human being
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals
Christianity is Platonism for the people
Christian belief is kept alive because it is soothing - the proof based on pleasure
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class
How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence?
Christianity is a revolt of things crawling on the ground against elevated things
Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The story in Genesis is the story of God's fear of science
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd'
'Faith' means not wanting to know what is true
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The great lie of immortality destroys rationality and natural instinct
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless'
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth
In heaven all the interesting men are missing
People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
A combination of great power and goodness would mean the disastrous abolition of evil