Ideas of Peter John Olivi, by Theme

[French, 1248 - 1298, Franciscan theologian.]

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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world
     Full Idea: It does not seem that a relation adds anything real to that on which it is founded, but only makes for another real aspect belonging to the same thing. It is real since an aspect exists in re, not solely in the intellect, but it is not another thing.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II.54), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.4
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination
     Full Idea: Quantity refers to nothing other than the parts of the thing quantified, together with their location or position, being extrinsically coordinated with each other.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Treatise on Quantity [1286], f. 49vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand 'extrinsically'. Is there some external stretching force? God spends his time spreading out his stuff? It is nice that being spread out isn't taken for granted. We take much more for granted than they did. Motion, for example.
Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts
     Full Idea: Quantity or extension adds absolutely nothing really distinct to the quantified matter or to the extended and quantified form, except perhaps the union and location and position of those parts.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], II:58,II:440), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.1
     A reaction: Other views seem to say that the Quantity provides the extension, but he seems to take that as given.
27. Natural Reality / F. Biology / 5. Species
Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being
     Full Idea: A subject is limited by its species to certain modes of being.
     From: Peter John Olivi (Summa quaestionum super Sententias [1290], I:586-7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2
     A reaction: I think this is so very the wrong way round. Species characteristics are generalisations about similar individual creatures. The 'species' doesn't do anything at all. It is a classification. See ring species, for example.