Ideas of L.A. Paul, by Theme

[American, fl. 2006, University of Arizona and Australia National University, then N.Carolina,Chapel Hill.]

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds