Ideas of H.A. Prichard, by Theme

[British, 1871 - 1947, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false
     Full Idea: In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: A lovely remark! In a flash you suddenly see why philosophers expend such vast energy on such unpromising views of reality (e.g. idealism, panpsychism). This might be the best definition of philosophy I have yet discovered.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties
     Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking
     Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept.
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do
     Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty.
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint
     Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality
     Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people
     Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty.
Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire
     Full Idea: The appreciation of the goodness of the effect is different from desire for the effect, and will originate not the desire but the sense of obligation to produce it.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: A wonderful rebuttal of Hume, and a much better account of duty than Kant's idea that it arises from reason. Perception of value is what generates duty. And (with Frankfurt) we may say that love is what generates value.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves
     Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
     A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.