Ideas of François Recanati, by Theme

[French, b.1952, Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris. Director of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.]

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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
22246 A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
16357 Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16360 Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
16374 There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18409 Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
16354 Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
22247 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought
22248 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context?
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
16371 Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
16361 A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
16373 Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
16375 Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
16377 Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
16378 An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
16387 Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
16358 The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
16367 There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
16368 Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
16370 A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
22242 Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers
22243 The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
16381 The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16365 Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
16356 There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16393 In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
16386 Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16372 Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
16388 We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
16359 Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
16353 Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
16352 A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
16348 Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
16384 Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
16355 Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
22245 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16382 Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
16364 Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
16389 If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
16363 Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16351 In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
16350 Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
16380 Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
22250 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
22249 The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker