Ideas of Thomas Reid, by Theme

[British, 1710 - 1796, Born at Aberdeen. Professor at the University of Glasgow.]

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
23657 The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
23655 An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
23634 Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23664 Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined
23669 Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
23651 Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
23650 Only individuals exist
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
11958 Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Molnar]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
23659 If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
23662 The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
23661 We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
23635 Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7631 Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
23637 Primary qualities are the object of mathematics
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
23638 Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
23639 It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
6492 Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Robinson,H]
23633 Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find
23654 In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings)
23660 The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
23641 People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
23642 If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
23549 We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Fricker,M]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
23658 Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23665 Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23681 The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
23676 A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
23652 We must first conceive things before we can consider them
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
23656 The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
23630 Only philosophers treat ideas as objects
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
23648 First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising')
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23653 If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle
23640 Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
23629 The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20051 Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23678 A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
23663 There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23674 If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
23675 We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
23672 To be virtuous, we must care about duty
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
23673 Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
23632 Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8383 Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Crane]
23677 We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
23667 Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23679 The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon
23670 Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations
23671 Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate