Ideas of Howard Robinson, by Theme

[British, fl. 1994, Liverpool University, and then the Central European University, Budapest.]

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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Na´ve realism
When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 1. Basis of Nature
Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined