Ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer, by Theme

[German, 1788 - 1860, Born in Danzig. Educated in France and Britain. Taught at the University of Berlin. Retired in 1831, and settled in Frankfurt.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free
     Full Idea: No one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophizes is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], II p.241-3), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is a direct reply to the opposite view expressed by Schleiermacher (and quoted by Lewis). I would say that to be a philosopher one must give priority to the philosophy, ahead of any religious beliefs. Thinking must be free.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else
     Full Idea: Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 027)
     A reaction: I think what draws people to philosophy is an interest in whatever is timeless. Contingent reality is so frustrating and exhausting. Hence I agree.
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness
     Full Idea: Every person is conscious of all philosophical truths, but to bring them to conceptual awareness, to reflection, is the business of the philosopher.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.68)
     A reaction: I like this. All human beings are philosophical. It seems unlikely, though, that we are all pre-conceptually conscious of the higher levels of philosophical logic.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view
     Full Idea: The more correct the subsumption of objects from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring the incongruity from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 013), quoted by Roger Scruton - Laughter §5
     A reaction: This accounts for ludicrous humour, but there seem to be plenty of other types. Exceptional stupidity is usually amusing without necessarily being incongruous. Though it is a departure from the sensible norm.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge
     Full Idea: The task of metaphysics is not to pass over experience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly, since inner and outer experience are certainly the principal source of all knowledge.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 428), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I wonder to what extent he meant ordinary experience, and to what extent he was advocating the study if science?
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation
     Full Idea: The plummet touches the bottom of the sea now at a greater depth, now at a less, but is bound to reach it somewhere sooner or later; the study of this inexplicable devolves upon metaphysics.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1)
     A reaction: This definition of metapysics contains the germ of despair about the subject. Does he hope that metaphysicians can explain what nobody else can?
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy.
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?')
     Full Idea: The Principle may be stated as 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be', which is a generalisation of the assumption which justifies the question 'Why?', which is the mother of all science.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This faith is the core of philosophy, to be maintained against all defeatists like Wittgenstein and Colin McGinn. Reality must be rational, or we wouldn't be here to think about it. (Maybe!)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other
     Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp)
     A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will
     Full Idea: Thing in itself signifies that which exists independently of our perception, that which actually is; …to Kant it was '= x'; to me it is will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IV:61)
     A reaction: Does he mean his own will, which is plausible since he has direct experience of it, or is he referring will in general - whatever that is?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer radically departs from his fellow idealists in his assertion of the irrational character of reality.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: This is the rejection of the original confidence about rationality of the stoics. And yet Schopenauer saw the principle of sufficient reason as axiomatic. Not sure how to reconcile those. Lewis identifies this idea as 'Romantic'.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable
     Full Idea: The world has two poles - the knowing subject and crude matter, which are both completely unknowable, the former because it is the knower, the latter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: A nice concept, that all of reality comes from their relationship, but the two components are intrinsically unknowable. Does God the Knower know his own mind?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer dispenses with Kant's a priori categories, since all interrelations between representations are given through the principle of sufficient reason.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: I'm not sure how Schopenhauer manages this move. Is it the stoic idea that reality has a logical structure, which can be inferred? Sounds good to me. Further investigation required.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral
     Full Idea: For Schopenauer there are physical necessity, logical necessity, mathematical necessity and moral necessity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: These derive from four modes of explanation, by causes, by grounding in truths or facts, by mathematical reality, and by motives. Not clear why mathematics gets its own necessity. I like metaphysics derived from explanations, though. Necessity makers.
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity
     Full Idea: Necessity has no meaning other than the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VIII)
     A reaction: I.e. there is only natural necessity, and no such thing as metaphysical necessity. But what about logical necessity(e.g. 2+3=5)? I think there may be metaphysical necessity, but we can't know much about it, and we are over-confident in assessing it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation
     Full Idea: All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV)
     A reaction: Based, I take it, on Hume. Presumably he means a posteriori understanding, as it hardly fits an understanding of arithmetic. Understanding needs more than just causation. What aspects of causation?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority
     Full Idea: Knowledge is power. The devil it is! One man can have a great deal of knowledge without its giving him the least power, while another possesses supreme authority but next to no knowledge.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:43)
     A reaction: He is referring to Bacon's famous adage. Bacon may be right about military affairs, but not about politics.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual
     Full Idea: By taking Cogito Ergo Sum as the only certainty, and by his provisionally regarding the existence of the world as problematical, the essential starting point of all philosophy was found, and its true focus in the subjective, the individual consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: Some people think this was a disaster, not a triumph. Descartes could have doubted himself and accepted the world as his starting point.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon?
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist
     Full Idea: Some say Schopenhauer would be less misunderstood if he had used 'force' or 'energy' rather than 'will' to characterise inner natures. But this would have steered his idealism towards materialism, of which he was an avowed opponent.
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: I presume therefore that Nietzsche's will to power is a commitment to materialism, since it occurs in material objects as well as minds.
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it
     Full Idea: The world which surrounds man exists only as idea - that is, only in relation to something else, the one who conceives the idea, which is himself. If any truth can be enunciated a priori, it is this.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 001)
     A reaction: Yes, but the idea we have is of a real world. It is definitely not part of the idea that it is an idea (unlike my idea for a Christmas present).
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions
     Full Idea: The double knowledge of the nature and action of our own body is the key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 105), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: Lewis calls this 'the heart of his philosophy'. Bodily awareness comes from acts of willing. So Lewis says 'the thing-in-itself is revealed to us in willing'. We experience Being and causation. Is he trying to combine idealism with the thing-in-itself?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing
     Full Idea: To be object for a subject and to be representation is to be one and the same thing. All representations are objects for a subject, all objects for a subject are representations.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §16 p.41-2), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is pure idealism in early Schopenhauer, derived from Kant. Are being 'an object for a subject' and being an object 'in itself' two different things? Compare Idea 21914, written later. I think Nietzsche's 'perspective' representations helps here.
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself
     Full Idea: Kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 417 App), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is Schopenhauer firmly opposing the Absolute Idealism of Kant's successors, who dismissed the 'thing-in-itsef'.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge
     Full Idea: A dictate of reason is the name we give to certain propositions which we hold to be true without investigation, and of which we think ourselves so firmly convinced we should be incapable of seriously testing them even if we wanted to.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:12)
     A reaction: This is closer to the cautious way modern thinkers are inclined to express the idea. Even Quine would be reasonably happy with this.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes
     Full Idea: What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception, it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: These certainly seems to be a sense-data theory. Philosophers are much more ready to separate the data from the understanding than neuroscientists are.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
All perception is intellectual
     Full Idea: All perception is intellectual.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 004)
     A reaction: Even in slugs? I suspect that this is a tautology. Schopenhauer will only allow my vision or hearing to become 'perception' when an intellectual element enters into it.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable
     Full Idea: The fundament upon which all our knowledge and learning rests is the inexplicable. It is to this that every explanation, through few or many intermediary stages, leads.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:1)
     A reaction: This is obviously true, and the only question is whether it is a necessary or a contingent truth.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive
     Full Idea: There are four forms of explanation, depending on their topic. Causes explain objects. Grounding explains concepts, Points and moments explain mathematics. Motives explain ethics.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §43 p.214) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: [My compression of Lewis's summary. I'm particularly pleased with this. I have done Schopenhauer a huge favour, should anyone ever visit this website]. The quirky account of mathematics derives from Kant. I greatly admire this whole idea.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness
     Full Idea: A consciousness without an object is no consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I Supp)
     A reaction: This hints at Hume's observations about the self. Certainly totally vacant consciousness seems inconceivable, but is that a necessary or a contingent truth?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity
     Full Idea: We often do not know what we desire or fear. For years we can have a desire without admitting it to ourselves ....because the intellect is not to know anything about it, since the good opinion we have of ourselves would inevitably suffer thereby.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 210), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 5 'Will'
     A reaction: The idea of unconscious thought crept up well before Freud. It is in La Rochefoucauld, and important in Nietzsche. Neuroscience seems to give it a strong priority over the conscious mind, which is a revolutionary idea.
Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises
     Full Idea: One might almost believe that half our thinking takes place unconsciously.. Usually we arrive at a conclusion without having clearly thought about the premises which lead to it.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:40)
     A reaction: Schopenhauer was a major pioneer of this crucial idea. I'm beginning to think it is much greater than a half.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will
     Full Idea: What we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what wills, the will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VII)
     A reaction: An interesting slant on Hume's scepticism about personal identity. Hume was hunting for a thing-which-experiences. If he had sought his will, he might have spotted it.
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will
     Full Idea: My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!).
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing
     Full Idea: The identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof ...the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], p.211-2), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 4 'Self'
     A reaction: I'm struggling to see this as a deep mystery. If we look objectively at animals and ask 'what is their brain for?' the answer seems obvious. This may be a case of everything looking mysterious after a philosopher has stared at it for a while.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself
     Full Idea: It is as perverse to desire the continuity of one's individuality which is being replaced by other individuals, as to desire the permanence of the body's substance which is always being replaced by new substance.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.54)
     A reaction: If I let that go, what am I supposed to hang on to? Nothing? Non-existence is not an attractive condition to aspire to.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us
     Full Idea: Everyone regards himself a priori as free in his individual actions, and only a posteriori sees that necessarily his actions follow from the coincidence of character with motives.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.55)
     A reaction: I'm not sure what experience shows. Necessity seems more obvious when observing other people. Samuel Johnson said experience showed freedom, not necessity.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character
     Full Idea: Man's action have been interpreted as free, which they are not, for every individual action follows with strict necessity from the impact of motive on character.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 023)
     A reaction: If 'character is fate' (Heraclitus) then presumably motive must also be fate to complete the determinist picture. I shall spend the next year redesigning my motivation.
We don't control our own thinking
     Full Idea: Thoughts come not when we want but when they want.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:37)
     A reaction: One of my favourite Nietzsche ideas originated in Schopenhauer!
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Concepts are abstracted from perceptions
     Full Idea: For Schopenhauer concepts are abstractions from perception, what he calls 'representations of representations', and are linked to the creation of language.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is a traditional view which dates back to Aristotle, and which I personally think is entirely correct. These days I am in minority on that. This idea means that (contrary to Kant) perception is not conceptual.
All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge
     Full Idea: The entire property of a concept consists in nothing more than what has been begged and borrowed from perceptual knowledge, which is the true and inexhaustible source of all insight.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], I:9)
     A reaction: Schopenhauer is usually seen as a sort of idealist, but this is a full endorsement of the empirical view of concepts, to which I largely subscribe. Note that he talks of 'knowledge', rather than of 'experience'.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body
     Full Idea: Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 018)
     A reaction: The word 'act' seems to beg the question (as does 'true'!). I am no longer sure that I know what an act of will is. Hobbes says there is no such thing.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will'
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: but he didn't know how to deify the will, and remained caught in the moral, Christian ideal
     From: comment on Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Writings from Late Notebooks 9[42]
     A reaction: Intriguingly, this seems to suggest that Nietzsche consciously sought to replace the absence of God with the human will, which strikes me as an odd, and very nineteenth century, idea. Loss of religion bothered them a lot.
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action
     Full Idea: Only the will is thing-in-itself. ...It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 110), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'
     A reaction: If will acts 'blindly' in forces of nature, then these seems to be the same concept as Nietzsche's 'will to power'. This seems to be heading towards Heidegger's Dasein, as a central and distinctive mode of being.
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss
     Full Idea: As the subject of willing I am an exceedingly wretched being, and all our suffering consistd in willing, ...but as soon as I am absorbed in knowledge, I am blissfully happy and nothing can assail me.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.137), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 4
     A reaction: So the source of his pessimism is subjection to his own will. However, since becoming absorbed in knowledge is an easy task for a scholar, he has little to grumble about. Nietzsche mocked the great pessimist for playing the flute every day.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives
     Full Idea: If, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect is our actual nature and the will is arrived at through knowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined we were acting would decide our moral worth. Imagined and true motive would be indistinguishable.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II Supp)
     A reaction: A nice argument. If motive is morally decisive, it is certainly crucial to decide between real and imagined motive (especially since Freud). But uncontrollable motive seems morally irrelevant.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Motivation is causality seen from within
     Full Idea: Motivation is causality seen from within.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], p.214), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: This is more illuminating about causation than about motivation, since we can be motivated without actually doing anything.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will
     Full Idea: The central problem of aesthetics is how satisfaction with and pleasure in an object are possible without any reference thereof to our willing.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], II:415), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: This does seem a good distinction. We can divide pleasures into willed and unwilled. Compare thinking that some remote stranger (in a photograph) is very beautiful, with falling in love with someone.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested'
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer belongs to a tradition which equates aesthetic experience with a 'disinterested' attitude towards its object, and is often cited as one of the chief proponents of such a view.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: 'Disinterested' is quite a nice word for one's attitude to art, though you then have to capture why you are also involved in it.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will
     Full Idea: The momentary silencing of all volition …is one of the principal elements in our pleasure in the beautiful.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: Iris Murdoch sees moral value in beauty, because it overrides selfishness. The perception of beauty is certainly something deeper than just another nice feeling. There is a cognitive element to it.
The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will
     Full Idea: In the beautiful we always perceive the intrinsic and primary form of animate and inanimate nature, that is to say Plato's Ideas thereof. …When an aesthetic perception occurs the will completely vanishes from consciousness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIX:205)
     A reaction: An essential Schopenauer idea. Iris Murdoch said something similar.
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity
     Full Idea: Exaltation of the Sublime is the struggle to maintain will-less knowing in the face of a threat to the human will. The Sublime contains an awful beauty and a delightful terror because it includes a threat to human existence.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 201-7) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Can you experience the Sublime when looking down a microscope? Can a mere theory in cosmology be sublime? Can a supposed perception of the Sublime ever be incorrect? We no longer worry about these questions, it seems.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics
     Full Idea: The emphasis on the presentation of Platonic Ideas distinguishes Schopenhauer's theory of art from standard Romantic theories, which emphasize the expression of emotion and feeling.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 5
     A reaction: Theories of art that neglect ideas, even if subliminally expressed, have gone badly wrong.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature
     Full Idea: Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], III 41)
     A reaction: A bit of a shock, because it implies human vanity, but it fits the best works of art rather well. What else reveals humanity's beauty? Beautiful deeds must be recorded.
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood
     Full Idea: For Schopenhauer, the point of art lies in the metaphysical liberation from selfhood that will-less aesthetic contemplation induces.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 3.6.3
     A reaction: I've never understood why anyone (Buddhists included) would want 'liberation from selfhood'. Certainly art can make us forget ourselves in a more objective view of things, but science can do that too.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better
     Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial'
     A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists
     Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics....
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them
     Full Idea: Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom'
     A reaction: The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational
     Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason
     Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion
     Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
     A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal
     Full Idea: Man is at bottom a dreadful wild animal.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:114)
     A reaction: As an example he cites the slave owners in the United States.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will
     Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim
     Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
     A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?"
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing
     Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others
     Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless
     Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire
     Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029)
     A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires
     Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect
     Full Idea: As a rule we find pleasure much less pleasurable, pain much more painful than we expected.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:149)
     A reaction: Never go on holiday with Schopenhauer. This is more accurate about pain, I think.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us
     Full Idea: Virtue must spring from that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the individuality of others the same essence as in our own.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: After all his pessimism, he arrives at a view similar to Hume's, that morality is built on natural empathy. But why built a moral theory on one base. Everything points us towards morality! Moral actions are more beautiful.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action
     Full Idea: As a botanist can recognise the whole plant from one leaf, …so an accurate knowledge of a man's character can be arrived at from a single characteristic action.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:118)
     A reaction: Very true. Great novelists specialise in such observations. One word can reveal a character, as well as one action.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty
     Full Idea: The Chinese name five cardinal virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom and honesty.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110)
     A reaction: I like politeness being on the list, though it seems rather superficial to be a virtue of character. Respect would be better.
Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices
     Full Idea: Because of their profounder ethical and metaphysical insight, the Buddhists start not with the cardinal virtues but with cardinal vices, …which are lust, sloth, wrath and avarice (and maybe hatred).
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:110)
     A reaction: This may be right. Our lives are affected much more by the vices of others than by their virtues, and most virtuous behaviour aims at rectifying the bad effects of other people's vices.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact
     Full Idea: Human life must be some kind of mistake. ...Boredom is a direct proof that existence is in itself valueless, for boredom is nothing other than the sensation of the emptiness of existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XI:146)
     A reaction: I think it is a good advertisement for existentialism that it makes something more out of boredom than Schopenhauer does.
Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity
     Full Idea: Only in the cleverest animals such as dogs and apes does the need for activity, and with that boredom, make itself felt.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], III:50)
     A reaction: But it is much more frequently young creatures, of almost any kind, that seek constant activity, and get continually restless. The most active adults need not be the cleverest.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another
     Full Idea: The state is essentially no more than an institution for the protection of the whole against attacks from without, and the protection of its individual members from attacks by one another.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:123)
     A reaction: He then has a swipe at Hegel for his inflated idea of the importance of the state. Schopenhauer is close to Hobbes on this one.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing
     Full Idea: Poverty and slavery are only two forms - on might almost say two words for - the same thing, the essence of which is that a man's energies are expended for the most part not on his own behalf but on that of others.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:125)
     A reaction: The modern world is full of people who righteously despise slavery, but think only of the poor that it serves them right.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness
     Full Idea: Freedom of the press must be regarded as a permit to sell poison. …I very much fear, therefore, that the dangers of press freedom outweigh its usefulness.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], IX:127)
     A reaction: On the whole the modern world disagrees with this view, but watching the popular press in Britain in the last twenty years has made me sympathise with Schopenhauer.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now
     Full Idea: Perhaps there is no one alive who would not already have put an end to his life if this end were something purely negative, a sudden cessation of existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XIII:158)
     A reaction: Nonsense, on the whole, but it is a nice question how many people would do it if it only took a painless instant.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable?
     Full Idea: If the act of procreation were neither the outcome of a desire nor accompanied by feelings of pleasure, but a matter to be decided on the basis of purely rational considerations, is it likely the human race would still exist?
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156)
     A reaction: This is almost certainly correct in the modern world. In tougher economic circumstances people seem desperate to have children who will help them survive.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives
     Full Idea: In philosophical morals animals are mere 'things', mere means to any end whatsoever. ...Shame on such a morality, that fails to recognise the eternal essence that lives in every living thing, and shines forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.96), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Good. I find Kant's theoretical indifference to animals very creepy (despite his kind attitude to them). And I also think the utilitarians are wrong to only value animals for their pain, as if any animal could be shredded for fun, if it felt no pain.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself
     Full Idea: The essence of nature is the will to life itself.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.60)
     A reaction: How would he have responded to Darwin? The will to life is the product, there, of a different and more remote force, such as the 'energy' of the physicist (whatever that is!).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing
     Full Idea: Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV)
     A reaction: An off-beat philosophical view of the question. Sounds more like a consequence of time than its essential nature.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil
     Full Idea: Let no one think that Christianity is conducive to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels 'world' and 'evil' are used almost synonymously.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: The source of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'. Do any religions throw you vigorously back into the middle of life, with its conflict and creativity?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect
     Full Idea: All systems of religion are the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.63)
     A reaction: Is this a compliment? It seems to be, because at least the mysteries are identified and given an outward form. A nice thought.
Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people
     Full Idea: Religion is the only means of introducing some notion of the high significance of life into the uncultivated heads of the masses.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XV:174)
     A reaction: Cf Philip Larkin's poem 'Church Going'. On the whole Schopenhauer didn't actually believe that our lives had any 'high significance'.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible
     Full Idea: The Creator created not only the world, but also created possibility itself; therefore he should have created the possibility of a better world than this one.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:156)
     A reaction: This is explicitly a response to Leibniz's claim that the Creator selected the best of all possible worlds from the available options. The Euthyphro Question hovers here: must the Creator accept what is possible (the platonic view), or create possibility?