Ideas of Wilfrid Sellars, by Theme

[American, 1912 - 1989, Taught at the University of Pittsburgh.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood)
     Full Idea: The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Philosophy and Scientific Image of Man [1962], p.3), quoted by Owen Flanagan - The Really Hard Problem 1 'Vocation'
     A reaction: I'm happier with broad things than broad hanging together, but to me this sounds about right.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations
     Full Idea: The 'Principle of Reducibility' says if an object is a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and such and such relations
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Philosophy and Scientific Image of Man [1962], p.27), quoted by William Lycan - Consciousness
     A reaction: This sounds to me a more promising attitude to reduction than all this talk of Ernest Nagel's 'Bridge Laws'. If we ask HOW a higher level property arises because of a lower level property, we can describe a mechanism rather than a law.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons
     Full Idea: In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what
     Full Idea: Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
     A reaction: This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be
     Full Idea: Sellars' Grain Problem contended that it was a problem for materialism that physical objects have a granularity whereas sensations are homogeneous and without grain.
     From: report of Wilfrid Sellars (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1956], Ch. n22) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1 n22
     A reaction: This doesn't strike me as a serious problem. I assume that my sensations are granular, but at a level too fine for me to introspect. There are three hundred trillion connections in the brain (Idea 2952), a lot of them involved in sensations.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts
     Full Idea: One can only have the concept of green by having a whole battery of concepts of which it is one element.
     From: Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.120)
     A reaction: This points in the direction of holism about language and thought, but need not imply it. It might be that concepts have to be learned in small families. It is not clear, though, what is absolutely essential to 'green', except that it indicates colour.