Ideas of Amie L. Thomasson, by Theme

[American, fl. 2009, Professor at the University of Miami.]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers

14480

Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment

14471

Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

14493

Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

14491

Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories

14489

Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

14485

Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable

14487

The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

21651

It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Hofweber]

14467

Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought

14479

To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people

14486

Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual

14481

Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

14482

If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses

14483

Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

14476

Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified

14477

Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention

14478

Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense

14466

A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14475

How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?

14474

Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to

19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions

14488

Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'