Ideas of Bernard Williams, by Theme

[British, 1929 - 2003, Professor at Oxford, London, Cambridge, and in America]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22355 In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
23283 Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
4243 Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries
4244 It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
22455 Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
4114 Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Foot]
22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Foot]
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20168 Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified
20167 Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
4128 Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
4366 We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Hursthouse]
4132 The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
4134 The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels"
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
4135 Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22410 Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22408 Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared
22411 For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one
4120 It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
23282 If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
4252 Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
4116 A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
4112 A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves'
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
3236 Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
4113 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty'
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
4250 The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent
4110 Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future
4249 "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation
4248 Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
22409 We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty
4122 If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests
4121 Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws?
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
22407 Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
4124 Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
4245 Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions
4246 Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
3234 Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view
3233 Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
3235 It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
4247 It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4131 Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
4133 Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good