19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects |

19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless |

19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language |

10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical |

16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory |

19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless |

19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct |

19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one |

19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language |

19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms |

16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition |

15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions |

13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth |

19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth |

19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified |

19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white |

19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction |

19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' |

19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true |

18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them |

15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects |

19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) |

19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects |

19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed |

19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics |

10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it |

17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics |

10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences |

10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory |

10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs |

16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined |

16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction |

10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth |

16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses |

15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate |

19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies |

19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms |

19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims |

19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems |

19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions |

10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying |

10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical |

13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules |

18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match |

10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true |

10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations |

13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X |

19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) |

10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function |

19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth |

13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth |

13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language |

18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions |

13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned |

13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it |

13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions |

13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics |

19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously |

10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory |

10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist |

13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them |