Ideas of Dale Jacquette, by Theme

[American, 1953 - 2016, Professor at Pennsylvania State University.]

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 7. Reason for Existence
Existence is completeness and consistency
Being is maximal consistency
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism