Ideas of Gabriel M.A. Segal, by Theme

[American, fl. 2000, At King's College, London.]

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing?
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts