| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined |