Ideas of J Pollock / J Cruz, by Theme

[American, fl. 1999, Collaborators on a book on epistemology]

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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation