Ideas of Hartry Field, by Theme
[American, fl. 1992, Professor at University of Southern California, and then New York University.]
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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
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9161
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Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
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10825
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The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
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10820
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In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
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13499
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Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Hart,WD]
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10818
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Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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10817
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Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
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9570
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In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Chihara]
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
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10260
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Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Shapiro]
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
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10819
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Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
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10827
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Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
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9226
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If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
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8958
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In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Szabó]
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
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18221
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'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
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8757
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The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
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18212
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Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
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10261
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The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Shapiro]
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18218
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Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space
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9623
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Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR]
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
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18215
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It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
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18210
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Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions?
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18216
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Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements
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18214
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Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful
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8714
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Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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18211
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You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
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8959
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Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Szabó]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
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18213
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Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
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9160
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Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
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9164
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We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
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9165
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Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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9162
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Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
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9166
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People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'
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14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
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9163
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If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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18222
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Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
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10826
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'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
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9917
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'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
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7615
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Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Putnam]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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8404
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Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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8401
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Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation
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8400
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Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones
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8402
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The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality
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27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
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18223
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In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / d. Substantival space
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18220
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Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 1. Space / e. Relational space
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18219
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Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously
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