Ideas of Nuel D. Belnap, by Theme

[American, fl. 1962, Taught at the University of Pittsburgh.]

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14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication
     Full Idea: 'All ravens are black' might profitably be read as saying not that being a raven 'implies' being black, but rather something more like 'Consider the ravens: each one is black'.
     From: Nuel D. Belnap (Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification [1970], p.7), quoted by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 04.5
     A reaction: Belnap is more interested in the logic than in the paradox of confirmation, since he evidently thinks that universal generalisations should not be read as implications. I like Belnap's suggestion.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts
     Full Idea: Throughout the whole texture of philosophy we distinguish two modes of explanation: the analytic mode, which tends to explain wholes in terms of parts, and the synthetic mode, which explains parts in terms of the wholes or contexts in which they occur.
     From: Nuel D. Belnap (Tonk, Plonk and Plink [1962], p.132)
     A reaction: The analytic would be bottom-up, and the synthetic would be top-down. I'm inclined to combine them, and say explanation begins with a model, which can then be sliced in either direction, though the bottom looks more interesting.