9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) |

9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature |

9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics |

9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary |

9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question |

9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 |

9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are |

9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' |

9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? |

9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise |

9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail |

9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism |

9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical |

9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise |

9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change |

9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement |

9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness |