Ideas of Alex Oliver, by Theme

[British, fl. 1996, At the University of Cambridge.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
10468 A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them)
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
10471 Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
10749 Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
10750 Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10747 Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them
10748 Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10721 If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete?
10719 There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
10716 There are just as many properties as the laws require
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
10720 We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10714 The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms
10715 There are five main semantic theories for properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
10742 Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
10730 If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals?
10724 Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place
7963 Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
10727 Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties
7962 Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
10722 Instantiation is set-membership
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10744 Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
10726 Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing
10725 Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
10745 Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Conceptual priority
10746 Conceptual priority is barely intelligible