10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) |
10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal |
10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker |
10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker |
10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment |
10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them |
10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? |
10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties |
10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require |
10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions |
10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms |
10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties |
10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars |
10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice |
10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes |
10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness |
10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts |
10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen |
10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place |
10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? |
7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy |
10722 | Instantiation is set-membership |
10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets |
10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things |
10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing |
10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law |
10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible |