Ideas of Michael Jubien, by Theme

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at the University of Florida.]

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Conceptual Analysis
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
Modality is relations among abstract platonic properties
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 6. Conceptual Dualism
Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
19. Language / D. Theories of Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects