Ideas of Jonathan Bennett, by Theme

[New Zealand, b.1931, Taught at Syracuse University.]

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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 3. Space / c. Substantival space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / a. Causation
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation / b. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped')
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive