7454 | Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher |

13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics |

13833 | 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction |

13834 | Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' |

13835 | Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with |

13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English |

13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem |

13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers |

13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds |

13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter |

13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically |

13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers |

13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it |

7447 | Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 |

7448 | Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) |

7449 | Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments |

7450 | In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence |

7451 | Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence |

7452 | An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection |

7459 | Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths |