Ideas of Richard M. Hare, by Theme

[British, 1919 - 2002, Professor at Oxford University.]

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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hooker,B]
Moral statements are imperatives rather than to avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Foot]
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
An 'ought' statement implies universal application
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Nagel]