Ideas of Hilary Putnam, by Theme

[American, b.1926, Taught at Princeton, then MIT, then Professor at Harvard University.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
7623 For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
2352 The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
6782 Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6267 A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
6272 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6276 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
4714 Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [O'Grady]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6266 We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
7617 Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6277 Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
4716 The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
8828 Truth is rational acceptability
7616 Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
18951 For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
6264 In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
6265 Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
6269 Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
2345 Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
2347 Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18953 Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18949 The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
18952 '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)'
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
18958 In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
9944 We understand some statements about all sets
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
9915 V = L just says all sets are constructible
13655 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18954 Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
18956 Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
18962 Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10066 Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
18961 We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18955 Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
14203 Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14207 If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
9913 The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
18959 Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
18200 Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
9937 I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations'
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
9939 It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
3663 How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9940 Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it
9914 It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics
18199 Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets
8857 We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
6280 Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory
2349 Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
9943 You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it!
17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality
14214 If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Lewis]
14205 The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
7610 A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7618 Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
18957 Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
2351 Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
18950 Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17643 Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay'
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
4718 If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [O'Grady]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
10269 Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9169 A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
5819 Conceivability is no proof of possibility
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
6284 If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
6273 Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
6274 Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
7620 Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18960 Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity'
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
14204 Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17084 You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3460 Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Searle]
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5495 Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Lycan]
2331 Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2071 If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
2332 Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
2348 Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
2344 If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Kim]
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2074 Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality
7611 Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2605 If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate!
2606 No machine language can express generalisations
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G]
3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Rey]
4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Crane]
14200 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
2343 Reference may be different while mental representation is the same
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
9168 I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else
5820 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here
7612 Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
7613 Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
2346 Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
2354 "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2336 Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible
2334 Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms
2335 Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271 How reference is specified is not what reference is
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
2341 Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference
2340 We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
9170 We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference
14201 Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
14202 Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
2339 Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't
2338 Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Scruton]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
5817 Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer
6279 A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6270 The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
6283 Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
14206 There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275 You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
7624 The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum)
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Mackie,P]
2342 "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
5818 If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O