Ideas of Richard Rorty, by Theme

[American, b.1931, Born in New York. Professor at the University of Virginia, and at Stanford University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Despair over Philosophy
If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Against Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Lanugage holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change?
19. Language / B. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
19. Language / C. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states
25. Society / A. State of Nature / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society