Ideas of Fraser MacBride, by Theme
[British, fl. 2004, Reader at Birkbeck College, London, then at Cambridge, then Manchester.]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486

We might define truth as arising from the truthmaker relation

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484

Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truthmakers

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466

If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18473

'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker

18481

Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483

The main idea of truthmaking is that what a proposition is about is what matters

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479

There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth

18477

There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482

Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18485

Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as minddependent

18474

Does 'this sentence has no truthmaker' have a truthmaker. Reductio suggests it can't have

18490

Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?

18493

Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489

Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476

'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is notF' may not be negative ('is not blind')

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
8923

Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
8926

For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480

Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18472

Which has priority  'grounding' or 'truthmaking'?

18471

Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475

Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21354

It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21353

Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
21352

'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478

Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours
