Ideas of Trenton Merricks, by Theme

[American, fl. 2003, Professor at the University of Virginia.]

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6123 Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
14415 A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
14395 If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true
14398 Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it
14403 If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
14397 Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
14396 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths
14400 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
14394 It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
14390 Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
14414 I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
14412 Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
14418 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property
14391 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
14419 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists'
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
14393 The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
6143 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / a. Vagueness of reality
6135 A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
14413 Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
6145 Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14416 An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6124 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
6134 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
6125 We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
14229 Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Liggins]
6142 The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
14472 If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Thomasson]
14469 Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
6137 Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
6127 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
6131 Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
6132 Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
6141 There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
6128 Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
14410 You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
6136 Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
6144 You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
6140 Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
6149 Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
6148 Human organisms can exercise downward causation
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
6146 Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
6147 The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones?
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / f. Presentism
14405 How can a presentist explain an object's having existed?
14406 Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous
14407 Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist'
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / g. Eternalism
17960 Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / h. Growing block of time
17961 Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [PG]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space-Time / 2. Time / i. Time and change
14411 Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it