| 6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour |
| 19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens |
| 14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it |
| 14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear |
| 14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true |
| 14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it |
| 14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core |
| 14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients |
| 14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths |
| 14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being |
| 14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things |
| 14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth |
| 14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? |
| 14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false |
| 14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property |
| 14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something |
| 19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white |
| 14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth |
| 19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem |
| 19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' |
| 19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets |
| 14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths |
| 14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified |
| 6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time |
| 6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent |
| 14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed |
| 6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists |
| 14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false |
| 6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? |
| 6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist |
| 6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples |
| 14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics |
| 6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways |
| 14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it |
| 14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage |
| 6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) |
| 6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing |
| 6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things |
| 6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts |
| 6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise |
| 6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object |
| 6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located |
| 6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region |
| 14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs |
| 19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person |
| 6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox |
| 14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base |
| 6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy |
| 14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker |
| 6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge |
| 6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons |
| 6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software |
| 6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice |
| 6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation |
| 6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties |
| 6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties |
| 19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity |
| 19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context |
| 19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition |
| 19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs |
| 19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? |
| 19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition |
| 19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it |
| 19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things |
| 19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought |
| 14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? |
| 14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous |
| 14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' |
| 17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real |
| 17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart |
| 14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it |