Ideas of Earl Conee, by Theme

[British, fl. 2004, Professor at the University of Rochester.]

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge