Ideas of Earl Conee, by Theme

[British, fl. 2004, Professor at the University of Rochester.]

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards