Ideas of Penelope Mackie, by Theme

[British, fl. 2006, Lecturer at the University of Nottingham.]

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
There are problems both with individual essences and without them
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by essence
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / e. Necessity of kinds
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not