17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments |

18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system |

18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction |

18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation |

18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition |

18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws |

18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications |

18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation |

18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence |

18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory |

18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system |

18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations |

18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic |

17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied |

17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience |

18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting |

17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so |

17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason |

17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights |

17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another |

17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them |

17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience |

17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? |

18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations |

17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements |

17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components |

17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size |