Ideas of Adolph Rami, by Theme

[German, fl. 2009, At the University of Göttingen.]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'