Ideas of Kathrin Koslicki, by Theme

[German, fl. 2008, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / o. Units
Objects do not naturally form countable units
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Numbers / p. Counting
There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus
Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries
We can still count squares, even if they overlap
We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Aristotle doesn't see essential truths or essential properties as necessary
If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Causal explanations
Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation'
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by essence
Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs
Aristotelian explanation by essence may need to draw on knowledge of other essences
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 6. Abstract Concepts / c. Abstracta by ignoring
We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / a. Natural kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / c. Knowing kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / d. Source of kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
26. Natural Theory / B. Concepts of Nature / 6. Natural Kinds / f. Reference to natural kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 12. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species