Ideas of Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E., by Theme
[, fl. 2013, At Oxford University.]
green numbers give full details 
back to list of philosophers 
expand these ideas
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125

If we define truth, we can eliminate it

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128

If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Metalanguage for truth
19120

Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127

The Tsentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124

A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness

19126

If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129

The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130

KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes nonclassical truth, which allows truthvalue gluts

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121

We can reduce properties to true formulas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122

Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories
