Ideas of Hans-Johann Glock, by Theme

[German, fl. 2008, Professor at Reading, and then Zürich.]

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis
     Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1)
     A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality
     Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2)
     A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use
     Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
     A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)?
The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept
     Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings.
     From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range.