more from Thomas Aquinas

Single Idea 11201

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes]

Full Idea

Incidental properties have an incomplete essence, and need to refer in their definitions to their subject, lying outside their own genus.

Gist of Idea

Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject


Thomas Aquinas (De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) [1267], p.93)

Book Reference

Aquinas,Thomas: 'Selected Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. McDermott,Timothy [OUP 1993], p.93

A Reaction

These are 'incidental' properties, but it is a nice question whether properties have essences. Presumably they must have if they are universals, or platonic Forms. The notion of being 'strong' can be defined without specific examples.